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05 · Procurement Basics

Most projects buy something — contractors, software licences, hardware, professional services. The moment money crosses an organisational boundary, the project manager's informal authority disappears and is replaced by a contract. This module covers the contract types and what each one does to risk allocation, how to run a defensible vendor selection, and the arithmetic of incentive contracts that catches out PMs who sign a fixed-price-incentive deal without knowing where its ceiling bites.

The procurement lifecycle

Phase Key activity Output
Plan Make-or-buy analysis, choose contract type Procurement management plan
Conduct Issue solicitation, evaluate, negotiate, award Signed contract, SOW
Control Manage performance, changes, payments, disputes Performance reports, change orders
Close Verify deliverables, settle claims, release retention Closure certificate, lessons learned

The three solicitation documents are not interchangeable, and using the wrong one wastes weeks:

Document Use when You are asking for
RFI — Request for Information You don't yet know what the market offers Capability information, no commitment
RFQ — Request for Quotation The requirement is fully specified and standard A price
RFP — Request for Proposal You know the problem, not the solution A proposed approach and a price

If you issue an RFQ for something you cannot fully specify, you will receive cheap quotes against a specification that turns out to be wrong, then pay for every gap through change orders. Issue an RFP.

Contract types and where the risk sits

This is the central table of the module. The contract type is a risk allocation decision, not a payment mechanism.

Type Buyer pays Cost-overrun risk Use when
FFP — Firm Fixed Price A fixed sum Seller Scope is precisely defined and stable
FPIF — Fixed Price Incentive Fee Cost + fee, sharing over/underrun, capped by a ceiling Shared, then seller above ceiling Scope defined, but you want a cost incentive
FP-EPA — Fixed Price with Economic Price Adjustment Fixed, indexed to inflation/FX Shared on macro factors Multi-year deals with commodity or FX exposure
CPFF — Cost Plus Fixed Fee All allowable costs + a fixed fee Buyer R&D; scope genuinely unknown at signature
CPIF — Cost Plus Incentive Fee Costs + fee that varies with performance Buyer, partly shared Unknown scope, but cost control matters
CPAF — Cost Plus Award Fee Costs + subjective award fee Buyer Long services deals judged on quality
T&M — Time and Materials Agreed rates × hours + materials Buyer Staff augmentation, small or urgent work

Three practical rules follow from this table.

A fixed price does not remove risk; it converts it into price and adversarial behaviour. The seller prices in a contingency you cannot see, and the moment your requirement moves, every clarification becomes a change order with a margin attached. FFP is right when scope is genuinely stable — and expensive when it is not.

Cost-plus contracts require you to audit. You are paying actual costs, so "allowable cost" must be defined in the contract and someone on your side must check invoices. A CPFF contract with no cost verification is an open cheque book.

T&M must always be capped. Include a not-to-exceed value and a review point, or it becomes cost-plus with no fee ceiling. T&M is for small or urgent work; if it runs longer than a quarter, convert it.

Worked example: where an FPIF contract actually bites

You award an FPIF contract on these terms:

Parameter Value
Target cost $800,000
Target fee $90,000
Target price $890,000
Ceiling price $1,000,000
Share ratio (buyer / seller) 80 / 20

The share ratio means that for every dollar of overrun, the buyer absorbs 80 cents and the seller 20 cents — until the ceiling, above which the seller absorbs everything. The seller's fee is:

Fee   = Target fee + (Target cost − Actual cost) × seller share
Price = Actual cost + Fee
Actual cost Fee calculation Fee Final price
$750,000 90,000 + (800,000−750,000) × 0.20 $100,000 $850,000
$800,000 90,000 + 0 $90,000 $890,000
$850,000 90,000 + (800,000−850,000) × 0.20 $80,000 $930,000
$937,500 90,000 + (800,000−937,500) × 0.20 $62,500 $1,000,000
$980,000 90,000 + (800,000−980,000) × 0.20 $54,000 ~~$1,034,000~~ $1,000,000

The number that matters is the Point of Total Assumption (PTA) — the actual cost above which the seller absorbs 100% of every further dollar:

PTA = ((Ceiling price − Target price) / buyer share) + Target cost
    = ((1,000,000 − 890,000) / 0.80) + 800,000
    = 137,500 + 800,000
    = $937,500

The fourth row confirms it: at an actual cost of exactly $937,500 the final price hits the $1,000,000 ceiling precisely. At $980,000 the formula would give $1,034,000, but the ceiling holds the buyer at $1,000,000 — the seller eats the $34,000.

Why you must know your PTA. Below it, the seller loses only 20 cents per dollar of overrun, so cost discipline is weak. Above it, the seller loses a full dollar per dollar — and a seller heading past PTA on a large contract is a seller who may cut quality, staff the job down, dispute scope aggressively, or in the worst case walk away. PTA is not just a pricing number; it is an early-warning threshold. Track the seller's actual costs against it and treat approaching PTA as a risk trigger with a named response, exactly as in module 04.

Vendor selection: weighted scoring

Awarding on price alone is how projects acquire cheap vendors who cannot deliver. Publish the criteria and weights before you open the responses.

Criterion Weight Vendor A Vendor B Vendor C
Technical approach 0.30 9 → 2.70 7 → 2.10 8 → 2.40
Relevant experience 0.20 8 → 1.60 6 → 1.20 9 → 1.80
Price 0.25 6 → 1.50 9 → 2.25 7 → 1.75
Delivery timeline 0.15 7 → 1.05 8 → 1.20 6 → 0.90
Support model 0.10 8 → 0.80 7 → 0.70 9 → 0.90
Weighted total 1.00 7.65 7.45 7.75

Check Vendor C: (0.30×8) + (0.20×9) + (0.25×7) + (0.15×6) + (0.10×9) = 2.40 + 1.80 + 1.75 + 0.90 + 0.90 = 7.75.

Vendor C wins, and Vendor B — the cheapest — comes last. B scored a 9 on price, the single highest score anywhere in the table, and still lost because price carries only a quarter of the weight while its technical approach and experience were weakest. That is the model working as designed.

Two disciplines make this defensible rather than decorative. Set the weights before seeing the bids, or you will unconsciously tune them toward a preferred vendor. And note the spread: 7.75 versus 7.65 is 1.3% — too close to call on the scores alone. When the top two are within a few percent, say so, and break the tie with a reference call, a paid proof-of-concept, or a risk assessment. Also apply screening criteria (mandatory pass/fail: insurance, certifications, financial stability) before scoring, so an unqualified bidder cannot score its way in.

The contract is the scope baseline once it is signed

Anything not in the statement of work is a change order, priced by the seller when they have no competition left. Before signature, walk the SOW against your WBS line by line and confirm every deliverable, acceptance criterion, and interface is named. An hour spent here is worth more than any amount of contract management afterwards.

How It Actually Works

The FPIF (Fixed Price Incentive Fee) payout curve is a piecewise linear function of actual cost, and its mechanics explain exactly why contract type shifts risk: below the Point of Total Assumption (PTA), the buyer and seller share cost overruns at the negotiated share ratio (e.g. 80/20 — buyer absorbs 80 cents of every dollar over target), so Seller payment = Target Cost + Target Fee − ShareRatio_seller × (Actual − Target) up to the ceiling price; once actual cost crosses the ceiling, the contract flips to effectively Firm-Fixed-Price and the seller absorbs 100% of every additional dollar. PTA = ((Ceiling − Target Price) / Buyer's Share) + Target Cost is the exact cost level at which that flip happens, and it's a number every vendor calculates privately before signing — which is why vendor behavior often changes sharply as actual cost approaches PTA (increased scrutiny of change orders, resistance to scope additions) even though nothing in the contract language itself changed. Weighted vendor scoring is a straightforward linear model, Score = Σ(criterion_weight × criterion_score), but its hidden failure mode is weight sensitivity: because scores are bounded (e.g. 1–5) while weights are continuous, a vendor's total ranking can flip based on a 5-percentage-point change in a single weight — always re-running the model with ±10% weight perturbations before finalizing a selection reveals whether the decision is robust or an artifact of one weighting choice.

Exercise

Plan a real procurement for a project of your own.

  1. Write a make-or-buy analysis for one significant component, with at least three factors on each side and a stated recommendation.
  2. Choose a contract type from the table and justify it by naming who carries the cost-overrun risk and why that is the right allocation here. State what would have to change for you to choose differently.
  3. Draft the solicitation: state whether it is an RFI, RFQ or RFP and why, and write a statement of work with at least five deliverables, each with a testable acceptance criterion.
  4. Build a weighted scoring matrix with at least five criteria, weights summing to 1.00, and three hypothetical vendors. Compute every weighted score and the totals. State the winner, and whether the margin is decisive or too close to call.
  5. Set up an FPIF deal of your own with a target cost, target fee, ceiling and share ratio. Compute the PTA, then compute the final price at three actual-cost levels — one below target, one between target and PTA, and one above PTA. Confirm your PTA is right by checking that the price at that cost equals the ceiling exactly.
  6. Name the one contract clause you would most want in place before signing, and what it protects you from.